Abstract
Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception. The premise is argued for, but, as I think, not well. Take, for example, the most common argument. We are asked to notice that the development of a human being from conception through birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a line, to choose a point in this development and say “before this point the thing is not a person, after this point it is a person” is to make an arbitrary choice, a choice for which in the nature of things no good reason can be given. It is concluded that the fetus is, or anyway that we had better say it is, a person from the moment of conception. But this conclusion does not follow. Similar things might be said about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow that acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say they are. Arguments of this form are sometimes called “slippery slope arguments” —the phrase is perhaps self-explanatory — and it is dismaying that opponents of abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically.
I am very much indebted to James Thomson for discussion, criticism, and many helpful suggestions.
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© 1976 Plenum Press, New York
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Thomson, J.J. (1976). A Defense of Abortion. In: Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Biomedical Ethics and the Law. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2223-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2223-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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